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 3\If you wish to strengthen a lie, mix a little truth in with it."{Zohar
1 Introduction
Making a decision under imperfect information is very common. A decision maker
usually asks a third party or an expert to provide some information or a recommendation.
For example, an individual is considering buying a new car to replace the car that she
currently owns. While a car dealer recommends a new vehicle whose quality is unknown
to her, she knows exactly the quality of her car. She cannot directly observe the quality
of the new car or the car dealer's incentives. How should she make a decision based on
the information that she has on her car and the dealer's recommendation on the new
car? Another example is the problem of internal promotion versus external hiring. Why
do some ¯rms promote an internal person despite the fact that an outside candidate
seems to have a stronger record? A recruiter often uses letters of recommendation to
decide whether she should hire an outside candidate without observing ¯rst-hand the
candidate's quality. However, the individuals who write the letters may have con°icts
of interest with the recruiter; some recommenders may be biased and want the job
candidates they recommend to be hired even though the candidates are not quali¯ed
for the job or have no quali¯cations whatsoever. Some recommenders may be honest,
and some may want to contribute to a successful hiring process where only quali¯ed
candidates are hired or the best applicant is selected. Most of the time, the recruiters
are unlikely to know the incentives of the person who wrote a given recommendation
letter.
In order to analyze communication in these situations, we develop a model of strate-
gic information transmission from a sender to a receiver. The receiver (she) has to choose
one of two goods, X and Y , which are assumed to be equally priced. The quality of
each good is random and exogenously determined. The sender (he) observes the quality
of X but not the quality of Y , while the receiver observes the quality of Y but not the
quality X. The receiver aims to buy the good that has higher quality and her decision is
based on the observed quality of Y and the message about the quality of X. We assume
that the receiver does not know the sender's incentives. On the one hand, the sender
may have aligned objectives with the receiver, i.e., the X seller may want the buyer to
buy X only if its quality is higher than Y , the buyer's outside option. This may occur
2when the seller has moral concerns or other-regarding preferences.1 In such a case, we
say that the sender is neutral. On the other hand, the sender may be biased, i.e., he
does not care about the quality of the good chosen by the receiver; his goal is to send
a message to the receiver so that X is chosen. There is no cost for the sender to send
a message, and the quality of X is not veri¯able at the time the receiver decides which
good to buy.
The timing of the game is as follows. First, the sender observes his type and the
quality of X, and the receiver observes the quality of Y . Then, the sender strategically
sends a message to the receiver about the quality of X: Upon receiving the message,
the receiver updates her beliefs about the type of the sender and the quality of X; and
makes a decision to buy either X or Y . The payo® of the receiver is the quality of
the good that she has chosen. If the sender is neutral, his payo® is the same as the
receiver's. If the sender is biased, his payo® is strictly higher when the receiver chooses
X than when the receiver chooses Y . The game can be applied to various situations
even though it is based on one sender and one receiver. For example, this game is
equivalent to a two-sender game in which the ¯rst sender strategically sends a message
about X, and the second sender is a non-strategic player who always reports the true
quality about Y . Alternatively, Y can be interpreted as a random quality aspiration
which is the receiver's private information.
Several questions arise regarding how agents communicate in these situations. Since
the receiver does not know the type of the sender, it is unclear how much information
the neutral sender can convey. At the same time, the biased sender may be able to
exploit the fact that the receiver believes that the sender might be neutral. Yet, it is
not clear to what extent the biased sender may take advantage of this situation. Our
analysis aims to answer these and other related questions.
Before stating our results, we compare our framework to those previously analyzed in
the literature. The study of sender-receiver games with costless communication (cheap
talk) was initiated by Crawford and Sobel (1982). They study information transmis-
sion from a better-informed sender to a receiver who later takes an action, within a
continuous space, that a®ects the welfare of both. We deviate from Crawford and So-
1In his experiment, Gneezy (2005) provides evidence that senders do care about receivers' payo®s
and are less likely to engage in deceptive communication when the detriment they may cause to the
receivers is greater.
3bel's framework in two aspects. First, inspired by the literature of persuasion games
(for example, Milgrom, 1981; Milgrom and Roberts, 1986; Fishman and Hagerty, 1990;
Glazer and Rubinstein, 2004), we assume that the action that the biased sender wants
the receiver to choose is common knowledge.2 In our model, the biased sender wants
the receiver to choose X, regardless of the state of the world. Hence, he has a strict
incentive to induce an expected value of the quality of X as high as possible. Second,
we assume that the receiver cannot observe the sender's incentives, which can be either
fully biased or perfectly aligned. These assumptions are more suitable descriptions for a
number of problems in economics, including the examples described at the beginning of
this paper and the problems described in persuasion games. Therefore, our analysis pro-
vides additional insights for the analysis of these problems. Other studies that consider
uncertainty in the sender's incentives and inspire our framework include dynamic models
by Sobel (1985), Benabou and Laroque (1992), and Morris (2001). In Sobel (1985), the
neutral sender is not a strategic player and will always mechanically report the truth.
Sobel ¯nds that the biased sender has an incentive to behave as if he is a neutral sender
to build credibility and increase his future opportunity. Benabou and Laroque (1992)
extend Sobel's model by introducing noisy signals about states of nature which allow
the biased sender to hide his own incentives repeatedly. Morris (2001) extends Benabou
and Laroque's model by allowing the neutral sender to be a strategic player. Morris
¯nds that increased reputation concerns provide an incentive for the neutral sender to
lie so that his truthful message has a larger impact on the receiver's decision in later
periods of the game.
These three dynamic cheap-talk games have two common features: (i) the authors
assume binary state and message spaces in order to make their dynamic models tractable
in repeated game settings, and (ii) the authors ¯nd that reputation can be strategically
built through repeated information transmission. In these papers, building reputation
provides strong incentives for message distortion regardless of the sender's incentives.
What would be other incentives of lying if a cheap-talk game is not repeated? Morgan
and Stocken (2003) analyze a model of stock recommendations in which a biased stock
analyst can manipulate stock markets through strategic announcements. Their model
is based on Benabou and Laroque's (1992) single-period game, but assumes continuous
2For a further discussion of the relation between the results provided here and the literature on
persuasion games, see Section 5.
4state and message spaces. A key di®erence between Morgan and Stocken's model and
ours is that, in Morgan and Stocken's, the expected utility of the biased sender is
not monotonically increasing in the induced expected value of the state. This occurs
because, even though the biased stock analyst has an incentive to induce high market
prices, he also has an incentive to provide valuable information to the public. This
implies that there are some states of the world in which the induced stock price which
is optimal for the biased sender is smaller than the upper bound of the state space. In
contrast, the biased sender in our model always wants to induce an expected quality
as high as possible, regardless the observed quality. Furthermore, Morgan and Stocken
(2003) focus on pure reporting strategies, while in our analysis, as explained below,
mixed revealing strategies play an important role.3
We study the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria of the game. As it is standard in
games of strategic information transmission, our game allows for in¯nitely many perfect
Bayesian Nash equilibria. There exists a unique equilibrium in which the neutral sender
always reveals the true quality of the good. We call this equilibrium truth-telling. In
this equilibrium, the biased sender pretends to be neutral by not fully exaggerating, or
even understating the quality he observed. In this case, we say that the biased sender
uses a feigning strategy. The rationale for feigning strategies is fairly intuitive: if the
biased sender always claimed that he observed the highest quality, then, upon receiving
his message, the receiver would have a strong belief that the sender was biased and the
message was not informative. In order to avoid this, the biased sender has to choose a
message within a range of quality so that the chosen message does not lead to too much
suspicion. All the messages the biased sender may send must induce the same expected
quality from the point of view of the receiver; otherwise, there would be a possibility of
arbitrage for the biased sender which is not allowed in equilibrium. For the same reason,
this expected quality is the maximum quality that can be induced in each equilibrium.
We ¯nd that a higher probability that the sender is biased leads to a more intense
feigning strategy. Formally, an increase in the probability that the sender is biased leads
to a leftward probabilistic shift in the distribution of the messages sent by the biased
sender. In other words, the initial distribution of messages sent by the biased sender
3In an interesting extension to Morgan and Stocken's (2003) framework, Li and Madar¶ asz (2008)
show that there are conditions under which both sender and receiver may be better of when the con°ict
of interest between them is private information than when it is common knowledge.
5¯rst-order stochastically dominates the distribution of messages when the probability
that the sender is biased has increased. This result follows from the fact that a higher
probability that the sender is biased causes the receiver to be more suspicious about
the type of the sender upon receiving a high quality message. Therefore, to compensate
this e®ect, the biased sender has to assign less probability density on the high quality
messages and, therefore, spread the density to the left. In terms of exaggeration, the
more likely that the sender is biased, the less in°ated the messages sent by the biased
sender in the truth-telling equilibrium are. Furthermore, we show that the maximum
expected quality induced in equilibrium is smaller when the probability that the sender
is biased is higher.
Other equilibria which are outcome-equivalent to the truth-telling equilibrium also
arise.4 These equilibria use di®erent communication codes, but the amount of trans-
mitted information is the same. In particular, we formalize the concept of upholding
equilibrium, in which the biased sender sends the highest message and so does the neu-
tral sender who has observed a quality which is higher than the maximum expected
quality induced in the truth-telling equilibrium. The neutral sender who observes a
quality which is lower than the maximum expected quality induced in the truth-telling
equilibrium sends a message equal to the quality he has observed. This equilibrium
has the intuitive interpretation that the biased sender always in°ates his message as
much as possible and so does the neutral sender who has observed a quality that is
high enough. In other words, this equilibrium pools the biased sender with the neutral
sender who has observed high quality. In this equilibrium, the codes used by the biased
sender and the neutral sender who has observed high quality are in°ating, nonetheless,
it is not a deception by the neutral sender.5 This pro¯le of revealing strategies seems
to be consistent with the pattern of communication through letters of recommendation
observed in highly competitive job markets. In such markets, if most recommendation
letters are highly in°ated, then a message which is not clearly fully supportive may be
interpreted by the receiver as a negative signal. In this case even the sender whose
4Two equilibria are outcome-equivalent if, for a given type of sender and realization of quality, they
induce the same action of the receiver.
5There is a range of unused messages in this equilibrium. In order to avoid incentives to deviate,
out-of-equilibrium beliefs of the receiver have to be speci¯ed so that departing from this revealing
strategy would harm every player.
6objectives are aligned with those of the receiver may exaggerate about the quality. We
call this strategy of the neutral sender an upholding strategy since the sender tries to
support a person (or a good) that is worth supporting.
We provide a few examples of equilibria with coarser information transmission. Equi-
libria in which less information is transmitted are usually regarded as unlikely to be
descriptive of actual behavior. Furthermore, experimental evidence shows that, in the
lab, the amount of information transmission is consistent with the equilibrium predic-
tions of the most informative equilibria.6 Altogether, this has motivated the search for
equilibrium re¯nement criteria for information transmission games (see Rabin, 1990;
Matthews, Okuno-Fujiwara, and Postlewaite, 1991; Farrell, 1993; Conlon, 1997; and
Chen, Kartik, and Sobel, 2008). We adapt one of the re¯nement criteria introduced by
Matthews et al. (1991), called equilibrium-announcement proofness, to the framework of
this paper.7 We show that a perfect Bayesian equilibrium is equilibrium-announcement
proof if and only if it is outcome equivalent to the truth-telling equilibrium.
Most papers in the literature, including Crawford and Sobel (1982) and Morgan and
Stocken (2003), identify partitional equilibria in which a sender sends an interval of
messages and analyze the relationship between the degree of preference misalignment
and the size of the interval. Crawford and Sobel (1982) show that a \babbling" equi-
librium, in which no information is conveyed, always exists and the maximum amount
of information conveyed in a partitional equilibrium depends on the degree of misalign-
ment in the agents' preferences. In the truth-telling equilibrium of our model, since
the incentives of the neutral sender and the receiver are the same, the neutral sender
communicates with full accuracy any observed quality which is lower than the expected
quality induced by the biased sender. However, details about the levels of quality which
6Indeed, Dickhaut, McCabe, and Mukherji (1995), and Cai and Wang (2006) show that experimental
subjects playing a version of Crawford and Sobel's model tend to overcommunicate, i.e., the correlation
between states, messages, and actions are consistent with the most informative equilibrium or even
higher. Sanchez-Pages and Vorsatz (2007) provide experimental evidence which suggests that the over-
communication phenomenon occurs because some experimental subjects have non-strategic concerns
for telling the truth.
7Matthews et al. (1991) introduced three criteria for re¯nements, namely announcement proof-
ness, strong announcement proofness, and weak announcement proofness. Conlon (1997) shows that
announcement proofness does not imply weak announcement proofness and suggests renaming this cri-
terion as equilibrium-announcement proofness. Here we adopt the name suggested by Conlon (1997).
7are higher than the expected quality induced by the biased sender cannot be conveyed
because all the messages claiming have observed such quality levels induce the same ex-
pected quality (equal to the expected quality induced by the biased sender). This result
is more extreme than Morgan and Stocken's (2003) where equilibrium prices are not
fully responsive to good news when there is uncertainty about the sender's incentives.
In our model, the induced expected quality is not responsive at all as a consequence of
the feigning strategy used by the biased sender. This strategy makes all the induced
expected qualities to be exactly the same when the neutral sender observes a high qual-
ity. The feigning strategies that arise in the truth-telling equilibrium has no parallel in
Morgan and Stocken (2003) because they do not consider mixed strategies of the biased
sender. These strategies do not arise in Sobel (1985), Benabou and Laroque (1992), or
Morris (2001) because the state and message spaces are binary in those models.
Olszewski (2004) analyzes a model in which the sender may be honest (mechanically
reveals the truth) or may have reputation concerns of being honest and possibly other
incentives. In his model, the receiver also has private information about the true state
of the world. Olszewski shows that if the sender has only reputation concerns, there
is an equilibrium in which he always reveals his private information. This is the only
equilibrium of the game when each signal he may observe fares di®erently with respect
to the private information of the receiver. As a result, the receiver always observes a
message exactly equal to the private information of the sender. This contrasts with the
coarse communication for high levels of quality that we obtain in our model. Yet, truth-
telling is no longer an equilibrium in his analysis when the sender, besides reputation
concerns, has other interests even if those incentives are perfectly aligned with those of
the receiver.
We provide a formal description of the game in the next section. In Section 3, we
provide an analysis of perfect Bayesian equilibria. In Section 4, we show that every
equilibrium-announcement proof equilibrium is outcome-equivalent to the truth-telling
equilibrium. We conclude and discuss our results in Section 5.
2 The Model
Consider a model of a sender, a receiver, and two goods whose qualities are represented
by two independent random variables, X and Y; which take values in the interval [0;1].
8We assume that X and Y are absolutely continuous. Let the realization, distribution
function, support, and density function of X be denoted by x, F, F;and f, respectively.
Similarly, the realization, distribution function, support, and density function of Y are
denoted by y, FY, F Y; and fY. We assume that F(0) = FY(0) = 0; F(1) = FY(1) = 1,
and f(x);fY(y) > 0 for all x;y 2 [0;1]. Hence E[X];E[Y ] 2 (0;1). The receiver's utility
(uR) equals to the quality of the chosen good. Let p 2 [0;1] be the probability that the
receiver choose X. Therefore, given p; x; and y, the receiver's expected utility is
E[uR(x;y)] = px + (1 ¡ p)y: (1)
We assume that the receiver can observe y, but not x, and the sender can observe
x, but not y. After the sender observes x, he will send a message about the observed
quality to the receiver. This message is not veri¯able, and the incentives of the sender
are not observable by the receiver. Let S be a random variable, with realization s,
which represents the sender's type. We assume that the sender takes on one of the two
types, neutral (s = 0) and biased (s = 1) and the probability that the sender is biased
is ¯ 2 (0;1). Furthermore, X; Y; and S are assumed to be mutually independent. If
the sender is neutral, his utility (uS) is the same as the utility of the receiver. In other
words, the neutral sender's incentives are perfectly aligned with the receiver's. If the
sender is biased his utility depends only on the receiver's choice: his utility is equal to
1 if the receiver chooses X and 0 if the receiver chooses Y . Since the biased sender does
not care about how the receiver bene¯ts from the good's quality, for simplicity, we focus
our analysis on the biased sender's strategies that are not conditional on the quality he
has observed.8 Therefore, the sender's expected utility can be written as
E[uS(s;x;y)] = sp + (1 ¡ s)[px + (1 ¡ p)y]: (2)
F, FY, and ¯ are assumed to be common knowledge. The game proceeds as follows.
Nature chooses x, y, and s. The sender observes x and s; and the receiver observes
y. The sender sends a message m about x to the receiver. The receiver then forms a
conditional expectation of S and X given m and chooses p to maximize his expected
utility. Since p chosen by the receiver depends on m and y, we denote the strategy of
8Indeed, allowing the biased sender revealing strategy to depend on the observed quality enlarges
the set of equilibria. However, this extension of the analysis does not provide further insights as biased
senders, in equilibrium, always induce the same expected quality in order to avoid arbitrage.
9the receiver by p(m;y) and the expected utility of the receiver (upon observing m and
y) can be written as
E[uR(X;y)jm] = p(m;y)E[Xjm] + (1 ¡ p(m;y))y; (3)
where E[Xjm] is the conditional expected value of X, conditional on observing a message
m. The neutral sender chooses a message and sends it to the receiver so that the
receiver makes a choice that maximizes her (and also his) expected utility. Even though
the neutral sender cannot observe y, he knows that the receiver can. His choice of
message determines E[Sjm], E[Xjm] and consequently a®ects p chosen by the receiver.
If E[Xjm] is greater than y, the receiver will choose p = 1; if E[Xjm] is less than y, the
receiver will choose p = 0; and, if E[Xjm] = y; then p can take any value in [0;1]. Since
FY is absolutely continuous, the optimal choice of p for the receiver can be in (0;1) with
probability zero. To avoid trivial technicalities, we assume that the receiver chooses
p = 1 if E[Xjm] = y: The biased sender aims to maximize the probability that the
receiver chooses X, thus he will choose a message m that maximizes E[Xjm]. Let the
distribution function of messages sent by the neutral sender who has observed quality x
be denoted by Fnjx and the distribution function of messages sent by the biased sender
be denoted by Fb. Now we de¯ne formally an equilibrium for this game.
De¯nition 1 A perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game is a triplet of (i) an action
rule p¤(m;y) for the receiver, (ii) a revealing strategy for the neutral sender de¯ned by
the family of distributions (Fnjx)x2[0;1] with supports ¹ Fnjx µ [0;1] for all x 2 [0;1]; and
(iii) a revealing strategy for the biased sender de¯ned by the distribution Fb, with support
¹ Fb µ [0;1]; such that:
(a)
p
¤(m;y) 2 arg max
p2f0;1g
fpE[Xjm] + (1 ¡ p)yg (4)
for all m 2 [0;1], and y 2 [0;1],
(b)
m
¤ 2 arg max
m2[0;1]
E[p
¤(m;Y )x + (1 ¡ p
¤(m;Y ))Y ] (5)
for all m¤ 2 ¹ Fnjx and x 2 [0;1]:
(c)
m
¤ 2 arg max
m2[0;1]
E[Xjm] (6)
for all m¤ 2 ¹ Fb, and beliefs are updated according to Bayes' rule whenever possible.
10For each perfect Bayesian equilibrium there is a function which maps the realization
of X; Y , and S to the choice of the receiver induced in the equilibrium. We call this
function the outcome-function and two equilibria are said to be outcome-equivalent if
their outcome-functions are the same.
We end this section by providing an example of equilibrium in a game in which
both X and Y are uniformly distributed in [0;1]. Consider a revealing pro¯le in which
the neutral sender always sends a message truthfully, i.e., if S = 0; then m = x for
all x 2 [0;1]. Hence, the marginal density of the neutral sender's messages, denoted
by fn(m), is also uniform, that is, fn(m) = f(m) = 1 for all m 2 [0;1]. Let the
biased sender's revealing strategy be given by the density function fb(m). A preliminary
observation is that the revealing strategy of the biased sender must be atomless because
fn(m) is atomless. If fb(m) has an atom at m0 2 [0;1] and the receiver receives message
m0, she will believe that the sender's type is biased and induce E[Xjm] = E[X]. Since
E [Xjm] = E [E[XjS;m]jm] where E[Xjs;m] is the expected value of X conditional
on observing m and s, then E[Xjs;m] = (1 ¡ s)m + sE[X], and E [E[XjS;m]jm] =
E [(1 ¡ S)m + SE[X]jm] = (1 ¡ E[Sjm])m + E [Sjm]E[X]. Therefore, we have
E [Xjm] = (1 ¡ E[Sjm])m + E [Sjm]E[X]: (7)
Using Bayes' rule we ¯nd PrfS = 1jmg = ¯fb(m)=[(1 ¡ ¯)f(m) + ¯fb(m)]. Since
E[Sjm] = PrfS = 1jmg; then
E[Xjm] =
(1 ¡ ¯)f(m)
(1 ¡ ¯)f(m) + ¯fb(m)
m +
¯fb(m)
(1 ¡ ¯)f(m) + ¯fb(m)
E[X]: (8)
In equilibrium, any message sent by a biased sender induces the same expected from the




(1 ¡ ¯) + ¯fb(m)
m +
¯fb(m)












If c < 1
2, then the support of the biased sender's strategy is bounded above by c because
fb(m) ¸ 0. This could not be an equilibrium since, biased senders would have an










Figure 1: Revealing strategies and conditional expected quality of X when X and Y are
uniform random variables.
quality for the receiver. Consider, then, c > 1
2: Since fb(m) ¸ 0; we conclude that the
support of the biased sender's revealing strategy is bounded below by c: Furthermore,
any m > c must be in the support; otherwise, sending m not in the support would
induce an expected value for the receiver E[Xjm] > c and the biased sender would have
an incentive to deviate. Therefore
R 1








dm = 1: (11)
Rearranging (11) yields c = 1
1+
p
¯: Thus, the density of the revealing strategy for biased










¯)m ¡ 1]; if 1
1+
p
¯ < m · 1;
0; otherwise.
(12)
Figure 1 shows the marginal density functions of the messages sent by each type of
sender, and the conditional expected quality for the receiver upon receiving a message m.
Since X has the standard uniform distribution and the neutral sender always reports
truthfully, the marginal density of messages sent by the neutral sender is given by
fn(m) = 1. The density function of messages sent by the biased sender is derived from
(12). The conditional expectation given m is drawn in bold; E[Xjm] = c for m > c,
otherwise, E[Xjm] = m. We ¯nd that the biased sender chooses fb(m) so that any
m 2 ¹ Fb leads to highest expected quality. When f(x) is uniform, the biased sender
sends m = 1 with highest density and no density for any m < c. For any m 2 (c;1), the
density increases with m at a constant rate. We can see that in order to convince the
12receiver to expect the highest quality, the biased sender cannot fully exaggerate about
the good's quality by always sending m = 1. He assigns a positive density to some other
messages that are lower than 1 but not lower than c. If the biased sender assigns too
much density to some high message, it will raise too much suspicion for the receiver to
believe that the received message is the true quality of X. The strategy that the biased
sender uses to disguise himself as a neutral sender, fb(m) according to (12), is a feigning
strategy. Finally notice that no neutral sender has incentives to deviate since those who
observe x · c induce a expected quality exactly equal to the one they observe and those
who observe x > c induce the expected quality c which is the highest expected quality
they can induce.
3 Perfect Bayesian equilibria
In this section we analyze the perfect Bayesian equilibria of this game. First, we provide
a lemma which shows that, in equilibrium, biased senders always induce an expected
quality which is greater than the prior expected quality of the good X: Furthermore, all
messages that may be sent by the biased sender induce the same expected quality which









be a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. There
exists c ¸ E[X] such that (i) c = E[Xjm] for all m 2 ¹ Fb and (ii) c ¸ E[Xjm] for all
m = 2 ¹ Fb.
Proof. Conditions (i) and (ii) are non-arbitrage conditions which must hold in equi-
librium so the biased sender does not deviate. Let M be the random variable which
represents the messages sent in the equilibrium. To prove that c ¸ E[X]; we argue by




E[XjS = 0;m] ¸ E[X]: This follows from the




E[XjS = 0;m] < E[X]; then E[X] = E[XjS = 0] = E[E[XjS =
0;M]jS = 0] < E[X] which is a contradiction.
13Now, for all m 2 F b; we have
c = E [Xjm]
= E [E[XjS;m]jm]
= E [(1 ¡ S)E[XjS = 0;m] + SE[XjS = 1;m]jm]
= (1 ¡ E[Sjm])E[XjS = 0;m] + E [Sjm]E[X]:











n ¹ Fb such that
E[Xjm0;s = 0] > c and therefore the biased sender would deviate by sending m0 instead
of m 2 ¹ Fb: Therefore c ¸ E[X]:
In Section 3.1, we turn our attention to the truth-telling equilibrium. We show
that there is a unique equilibrium in which the neutral sender always sends a truthful
message. In such an equilibrium, the biased sender uses a feigning strategy which mixes
his messages within a range bounded below by the maximum quality induced in the
equilibrium. The size of the message range (or the support of the revealing strategy) used
by the biased sender is increasing in the probability that a sender is biased. Thus, when
the probability that a sender is biased is larger, the support includes lower quality levels,
and hence, the message is less in°ated. Consequently, in a truth-telling equilibrium, the
maximum induced expected quality is decreasing on the probability that the sender
is biased. In Sections 3.2 and 3.3, we provide equilibria in which the sender and the
receiver use di®erent codes and equilibria that involve less information transmission,
respectively.
3.1 Truth-telling equilibrium
In a truth-telling equilibrium, the neutral sender always reports the observed quality,
i.e., if the sender is neutral, then m = x for all x 2 [0;1]. In this case we say that the
neutral sender adopts a truth-telling strategy. We ¯nd that there is a unique truth-telling
equilibrium.
Theorem 1 There exists a unique truth-telling equilibrium.
Proof. First we provide a revealing strategy for the biased sender characterized by a
revealing strategy fb(m) such that the neutral sender's truth-telling strategy and fb(m)
induce a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
14Step 1: Bayesian updating and computation of E[Xjm]:
Given a truth-telling strategy for the neutral sender and a revealing strategy with
density fb(m) for the biased sender, then the expected quality of the good X is given
by
E [Xjm] = E [E[XjS;m]jm]
= E [(1 ¡ S)m + SE[X]jm]
= m(1 ¡ E[Sjm]) + E [Sjm]E[X]:
E [Sjm] = PrfS = 1jmg; thus, using Bayes' rule, we obtain
PrfS = 1jmg =
¯fb(m)





(1 ¡ ¯)f(m) + ¯fb(m)
m +
¯fb(m)
(1 ¡ ¯)f(m) + ¯fb(m)
E[X]:
Step 2: The biased sender's feigning strategy.
In equilibrium all the messages sent by the biased sender induce the same expected
quality from the point of view of the receiver. Denote this expected quality by c: Then
c =
(1 ¡ ¯)f(m)
(1 ¡ ¯)f(m) + ¯fb(m)
m +
¯fb(m)
(1 ¡ ¯)f(m) + ¯fb(m)
E[X]:










Since the marginal distribution of the neutral sender's message has the support [0;1],
then Lemma 1 implies ¹ Fb := [c;1].
Step 3: Existence and uniqueness of c.
The revealing strategy of the biased sender satis¯es
R


















¡ c = 0: (14)
De¯ne the function t(z) : [0;1] ! R by








15Notice that t(0) =
E[X]










Therefore, the intermediate value theorem guarantees the existence of z¤ 2 (0;1) such
that t(z¤) = 0: Since dt=dz < 0 on (0;1); t(z) = 0 only at z = z¤:
In order to ¯nish the proof we need to show that the neutral sender would not
deviate from the truth-telling strategy. Since fb(m) = 0 for all m · c, for x · c; we
have E[Xjm] = m and m = x; thus E[Xjm] = x and therefore the neutral sender does
not deviate. Since fb(m) > 0 for m > c; then E[Xjm] = c for all m > c; thus for x > c;
we have E[Xjm] = c: Since c = sup
m2[0;1]
E[Xjm]; the neutral sender who has observed
x > c does not deviate.
Theorem 1 shows that the truth-telling equilibrium is unique, i.e, given that the
neutral sender always tells the truth, the revealing strategy chosen by the biased sender
(fb(m)) that yields a perfect Bayesian equilibrium is unique. Next we show some char-
acteristics of fb(m): (i) fb(m) ¯rst-order stochastically dominates (FOSD) f(m), and
(ii) If ¯0 > ¯, then fb(m) FOSD f0
b(m), the biased sender's mixed strategy given ¯0.
Furthermore, if c0 is the expected value of quality upon receiving high messages given
¯0, then c0 < c.
Remark 1 fb(m) FOSD f(m).














Therefore in ¹ Fb, fb(m) crosses f(m) only once.
Remark 2 If ¯0 > ¯, then fb(m) FOSD f0
b(m) and c0 < c.









c (m ¡ c)f(m)dm
¯(1 ¡ ¯)
R 1
c f(m)dm + ¯2 < 0: (17)
16Therefore, if ¯0 > ¯, then c0 < c. It follows that, for m 2 [c0;c], f0
b(m) ¸ fb(m). For
m 2 (c;1], let g(m) := f0
b(m)=fb(m) and notice that
g(m) =
(1 ¡ ¯0)¯(c ¡ E[X])(m ¡ c0)






(1 ¡ ¯0)¯(c ¡ E[X])(c0 ¡ c)
¯0(1 ¡ ¯)(c0 ¡ E[X])(m ¡ c)2 < 0
and thus f0
b(m) and fb(m) cross only once. So fb(m) FOSD f0
b(m):
3.2 Upholding equilibria
To derive a truth-telling equilibrium, we ¯rst assume that the neutral sender always tells
the truth, and then we ¯nd a corresponding feigning strategy chosen by the biased sender
that constitutes a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. In this section, we identify another class
of equilibria where the biased sender always fully exaggerates, i.e. F b = f1g, and there
is a revealing strategy for the neutral sender which constitutes an equilibrium. Here we
denote revealing strategies for neutral senders which are deterministic by the function
¹n : [0;1] ! [0;1]: For example, the truth-telling revealing strategy can be represented
by the function ¹n(x) = x; for all x 2 [0;1]. In particular, we focus on revealing strategies
for the neutral sender who reveals the true quality up to a certain quality (threshold),
and for qualities higher than the threshold, the neutral sender uses an in°ated language
by sending the message m = 1: In other words, for high enough qualities, neutral senders
pool together all the qualities, therefore inducing the highest possible quality which is
possible to induce in equilibria with this kind of revealing strategies.






1; if x ¸ !;
x otherwise.
An equilibrium is upholding if ¹n is upholding.
Note that this de¯nition is not limited to sending the message m = 1 when x ¸
!. The de¯nition can be generalized to any message that is greater than ! or any
randomization in an interval that is a subset of [!;1]. We assume that E[Xjm] = E[X]







17Theorem 2 There exists a unique upholding equilibrium in which ¹ Fb = f1g.
Proof. Let c := E[Xjm = 1]: Then, in equilibrium, ¹n(x) = 1 for all x > c, otherwise
E[Xjm = x] = x > c and the biased sender would deviate. Then





+ E[Sjm = 1]E[X]
Using Bayes' rule,
E [Sjm = 1] =
¯


















The last expression can be shown to be equivalent to (14). It follows that c uniquely
exists.
In this case, the neutral sender whose objectives are aligned with those of the receiver
may used an in°ated language about the quality in order to avoid the receiver being
misled by of-equilibrium-path beliefs. That is why this strategy of the neutral sender is
said to be upholding. It is important to notice that this revealing strategy for the neutral
sender, while being in°ated, it is not deceptive. The neutral sender, when sending the
message m = 1, knows that the receiver does not interpret this message literally; in
fact the expected value induced by this message is less than the quality observed by
the neutral sender. Indeed, this equilibrium is outcome-equivalent to the truth-telling
equilibrium, yet only deterministic revealing strategies are used by both neutral and
biased senders.
3.3 Less informative equilibria
In most cheap-talk models, it is easy to verify that a babbling equilibrium and other
equilibria which allow for less information transmission than the truth-telling equilibrium
exist. Here we provide an example. We revisit the example in Section 2 where both X








which is partitional: (i) the neutral sender who has observed a quality above a certain
level b c; to be speci¯ed below, randomizes his messages uniformly over the interval [b c;1];
independently of the observed quality, (ii) the neutral sender who has observed a quality
18below b c randomizes his messages uniformly over the interval [0;b c]; independently of the
observed quality, and (iii) the biased sender randomizes his messages uniformly over the
interval [b c;1]. We ¯nd that, to the receiver, messages in [0;b c] induce an expected quality
of b c
2, while messages in [b c;1] induce an expected quality denoted by °(b c); which is a





















(1 ¡ ¯)(1 ¡ b c2) + ¯
(1 ¡ ¯)(1 ¡ b c) + ¯
:
If the neutral sender who has observed x > b c reveals a message in [b c;1] and the neutral
sender who has observed x < b c reveals a message in [0;b c]; it follows that the former
prefers inducing °(b c) while the latter prefers inducing b c
2: Figure 2 shows the induced
expected qualities in both intervals for every possible bipartition with cuto® b c: We ¯nd
that °(b c) > b c
2 for all b c 2 (0;1): Since Y is uniformly distributed, it is intuitive to
formalize that, for the neutral sender who has observed b c to be indi®erent between
randomizing in each interval, it is necessary and su±cient that °(b c) ¡ b c = b c ¡ b c
2, or
equivalently, °(b c) = 3
2b c. Thus, using (19), we ¯nd that b c satis¯es
1
2
(1 ¡ ¯)(1 ¡ b c2) + ¯










example, if ¯ = 0:1, then b c ¼ 0:46: Thus, in this equilibrium, the neutral sender who
has observed a quality greater than 0.46 and the biased sender randomizes his messages
uniformly in the interval [0:46;1] and each of these messages induces an expected quality
of 0.69. On the other hand the neutral sender who has observed a quality lower than 0.46
randomizes his messages uniformly in the interval [0;0:46] and each of these messages
induces an expected quality of 0.23.
The example with two pools of messages can be easily generalized to N + 1 pools
of messages, for N = 1;2;:::, where the biased sender pools with the neutral sender
who has observed the highest quality.9 In other words, information transmission can be
arbitrarily detailed within the interval of qualities corresponding to the ¯rst N pools of








Figure 2: Revealing strategies and conditional expected quality of X under standard
uniform distribution




and the expected value induced by each type of sender, for all x 2 [0;1]; converges to
the induced expected value of the truth-telling equilibrium.
We do not attempt to characterize all the perfect Bayesian equilibria of this game.
Several re¯nement criteria in the literature suggest that the notion of perfect Bayesian
equilibrium allows for too many uninformative equilibria which are implausible. In the
next section, we analyze a re¯nement criterion and identify the equilibria that satisfy it.
In this characterization, the truth-telling equilibrium described above plays an important
role.
4 Equilibrium announcements
The multiplicity of equilibria makes it di±cult to use the perfect Bayesian equilibrium
concept to provide predictions about how people behave. Moreover, equilibria which
predict little or no information transmission at all, such as the babbling equilibrium,















N ) : This expression for b c can be obtained by identifying the quality
b c which leaves a neutral sender indi®erent between pooling in the group of neutral senders who observe
highest qualities and inducing an expected quality of °(b c); and pooling in the group of neutral senders









2 : The other N
pools of the partition are equally sized and cover all the range [0;b c].
20actions (see Matthews et al., 1991; Farrell, 1993; Cai and Wang, 2006). Some of the
re¯nement criteria studied in the literature help select equilibria, especially those which
involve more information transmission. Matthews et al. (1991) provide one of such cri-
teria, namely equilibrium-announcement proofness (EAP). In this section, we adapt the
EAP concept to the game analyzed in this paper. Matthews et al. (1991) motivate its
construction by imposing a number of rationality restrictions. This motivation captures
and carries further the notion of neologism proofness behind Farrell's (1993) re¯nement
criterion. Furthermore, Conlon (1997) shows that if there is a Pareto dominant equi-
librium, then it will be selected by EAP. It turns out that this re¯nement criterion is
particularly tractable in our model: as we will see below, it is easy to show that the
truth-telling equilibrium is EAP. Furthermore, we show that any EAP equilibrium is
outcome equivalent to the truth-telling equilibrium. Finally, the equilibrium selected by
EAP, i.e., the truth-telling equilibrium, also satis¯es an adapted version of the seemingly
less restrictive NITS criterion studied by Chen et al. (2008).
The concept of equilibrium-announcement proofness relies on the assumption that
senders can make an argument which may convince the receiver to do something di®erent
from what she is prescribed to play on the equilibrium path given the type of the sender
and observed quality. Making such an argument obliges the sender to describe a full
pro¯le of messages and announcements which every type of sender would do. This
pro¯le, called announcement strategy, distinguishes between the senders who announce
this pro¯le and those who do not, and follow the equilibrium revealing prescription. The
senders who announce this pro¯le are called deviants. Along with the pro¯le, a deviant
sender reveals a speci¯c message which may be interpreted as a claim about the quality
he has observed. The whole set of information, including both the speci¯c message and
the described announcement strategy is called an announcement. If the announcement
is compelling to the receiver, the expected quality is computed consistently with the
announcement strategy and the Bayes rule. The following de¯nition formalizes this
concept.
De¯nition 3 An announcement strategy is a function ± : D ! ¢([0;1]) with D µ
(f0;1g £ [0;1]). An announcement is a pair ha;±i where ± is an announcement strat-
egy and a 2 ±(D) with ±(D) := [
(s;x)2D
±(s;x) and ±(s;x) is the support of ±(s;x): An




(0;x)2D ±(aj0;x)f(x)xdx + ¯±(aj1)E[X]
(1 ¡ ¯)
R
(0;x)2D ±(aj0;x)f(x)dx + ¯±(aj1)
;
where ±(aj0;x) is the probability distribution of the announcement a conditional on the
type of sender being s = 0 and the quality of the good being x; and ±(aj1) is the probability
of the announcement a conditional on the type of sender being s = 1:
In order to be compelling to the receiver, announcement strategies (and the cor-
responding announcements) have to satisfy some credibility criteria. Matthews et al.
(1991) suggest a credibility criterion which forces the receiver to have rational beliefs in
the sense that she, upon hearing an announcement, realizes that the sender knows the
class of announcement strategies that are believable, and that he could have obtained
the equilibrium payo®s by sticking to the equilibrium pro¯le. Therefore, the information
deviant senders want to convey must induce actions that these senders prefer to those
in the equilibrium path or those actions induced by other credible announcement strate-
gies. Lastly, in order to avoid deviations from this announcement strategy, there must
exist some announcement strategy for the non-deviants such that the whole pro¯le of
announcements form a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which the speci¯c set of messages
sent by the deviants and the non-deviants are disjoint.
Altogether, credibility may be summarized in Conditions 1-5 below (in these condi-
tions, p¤(m;y) and E[Xjm] refer to those of the equilibrium which is being tested against
the EAP criterion). The ¯rst condition (C1) requires that all the deviant senders weakly
prefer the outcome of the announcement (if believed) to the outcome of the equilibrium
and, at least one of them, strictly prefers the outcome of the announcement (if believed)
to the outcome of the equilibrium.
Condition 1 Neutral senders:
Let p(ha;±i;y) 2 argmaxp2f0;1gfpE[Xjha;±i] + (1 ¡ p)yg: Then
E[p(ha;±i;Y )x + (1 ¡ p(ha;±i;Y ))Y ] ¸ max
m2[0;1]
E[p
¤(m;Y )x + (1 ¡ p
¤(m;Y ))Y ] (20)






22for all a 2 ±(1;x) and (1;x) 2 D:
And either (20) or (21) is satis¯ed with strict inequality for some (s;x) 2 D and
a 2 ± (s;x).
The second condition (C2) requires that all the non-deviant senders weakly prefer
the outcome of the equilibrium to the outcome of the announcement if believed by the
receiver.
Condition 2 Neutral senders:
E[p(ha;±i;Y )x + (1 ¡ p(ha;±i;Y ))Y ] · max
m2[0;1]
E[p
¤(m;Y )x + (1 ¡ p
¤(m;Y ))Y ]
for all (0;x) 2 Dc and a 2 ± (D):10
Biased senders:
E[Xjha;±i] · maxm2[0;1] E[Xjm] for all (1;x) 2 Dc and a 2 ± (D):
The third condition (C3) requires that within deviant types, each of them prefers
sending messages according to the announcement strategy prescription for that type
to sending messages according to the announcement strategy prescription for another
deviant type.
Condition 3 Neutral senders:
E[p(ha;±i;Y )x + (1 ¡ p(ha;±i;Y ))Y ] ¸ E[p(hb a;±i;Y )x + (1 ¡ p(hb a;±i;Y ))Y ]
for all (0;x) 2 D, a 2 ± (0;x), and b a 2 ± (D) n ± (0;x):
Biased senders: E[Xjha;±i] ¸ E[Xjhb a;±i] for all (1;x) 2 D; a 2 ± (1;x); and b a 2
± (D) n ± (1;x):
The fourth condition (C4) requires that there exists a revealing pro¯le for the non-
deviant senders such that, along with the revealing strategies of the deviant senders,
this pro¯le forms a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which the set of messages sent by
the deviant senders and the non-deviant senders are disjoint.
10The complement of D is de¯ned with respect to the type space f0;1g £ [0;1]; i.e., DC :=
(f0;1g £ [0;1]) n D:
23Condition 4 If the set of non-deviants is not empty, there is an announcement strategy








where the receiver holds Bayesian beliefs wherever it is possible, is a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium.
The last condition (C5) requires that no deviant sender prefers any other announce-
ment strategy in which he is also a deviant sender and C1, C2, C3, and C4 are satis¯ed.
Condition 5 If the announcement strategy ±0 (with domain D0) also satis¯es C1-C4










E[p(ha;±i;Y )x + (1 ¡ p(ha;±i;Y ))Y ] ¸ E[p(ha
0;±
0i;Y )x + (1 ¡ p(ha
0;±
0i;Y ))Y ]
for all (0;x) 2 D \ D0, a 2 ± (0;x), and a0 2 ± (0;x)
Biased senders:
E[Xjha;±i] ¸ E[Xjha0;±0i] for all (1;x) 2 D \ D0, a 2 ± (1;x), and a0 2 ± (1;x):
De¯nition 4 An announcement strategy ± (with domain D) and the corresponding an-









they satisfy C1, C2, C3, C4, and C5.
A perfect Bayesian equibrium is EAP if there is no announcement satisfying C1, C2,
C3, C4, and C5.









proof (EAP) if there is no credible announcement strategy related to it.
This following result establishes that the truth-telling equilibrium is EAP. Further-
more, every EAP equilibrium is outcome-equivalent to the truth-telling equilibrium.
Theorem 3 The truth-telling equilibrium is EAP. A perfect Bayesian equilibrium is
EAP if and only if it is outcome-equivalent to the truth-telling equilibrium.
24The proof of this result relies on the fact that a credible announcement strategy
requires some senders to be better o® than in the truth-telling equilibrium by making
an announcement. However, the proof reveals that it is not possible to ¯nd a pro¯le
such that a sender can have a higher expected utility than in the truth-telling equilib-
rium. This occurs because the neutral sender who has observed quality x · c already
maximizes his utility in the truth-telling equilibrium by inducing E[Xjm] = x, and it
is impossible for the neutral sender who has observed x > c and the biased sender, to
raise the induced expected quality beyond c: The second part of the result follows from
the fact that the same argument applies to every equilibrium which is outcome equiv-
alent to the truth-telling equilibrium. Furthermore, for any equilibrium which is not
outcome equivalent to the truth-telling equilibrium, a revealing pro¯le corresponding
to the truth-telling equilibrium can be announced and such an announcement satis¯es
C1{C5.
Proof. First we prove that the truth-telling equilibrium is EAP. From the proof of the
theorem that shows existence and uniqueness of the truth-telling equilibrium, and, in
particular, from the expression for fb(m); we know that c > E[X]: For every x · c;
E[Xjm] = x: Therefore, the neutral sender with x · c reaches his maximum utility in
the truth-telling equilibrium. Suppose there exists a credible announcement strategy ±
which satis¯es C1-C5. Since every type (0;x) such that x · c is reaching his maximum
expected payo®, we conclude that the announcement strategy ± must provide a strictly
higher payo® either to a type (0;x) such that x > c, or an strictly higher payo® to a
type (1;x): In either case, this implies that there is a non empty set of announcements
ha;±i such that E[Xjha;±i] > c: Let c0 := sup
a02±(D)
E[Xjha0;±i] and




C3 imposes that every type (0;x) such that x ¸ c0 and every type (1;x) makes an
announcement ha;±i such that a 2 A: Suppose only types (0;x) such that x ¸ c0 and




c0 f(x)xdx + ¯E[X]
(1 ¡ ¯)
R 1
c0 f(x)dx + ¯











z f(x)xdx + ¯E[X]
(1 ¡ ¯)
R 1
z f(x)dx + ¯
:












z f(x)dx + ¯
i2 ;
thus the sign of °0(z) is the same as the sign of (1¡¯)
R 1
z f(x)(x¡z)dx+¯ (E[X] ¡ z):
From the proof of the existence and uniqueness of the truth-telling equilibrium, (1 ¡
¯)
R 1
z f(x)(x ¡ z)dx + ¯ (E[X] ¡ z) < 0 for all z > c: It follows that c0 < c; which is
a contradiction. So far we have assumed that types (0;x) make announcements ha;±i
with a 2 A only if x ¸ c0: If types (0;x) with x < c0 too make announcements ha;±i




c0 f(x)xdx + ¯E[X]
(1 ¡ ¯)
R 1
c0 f(x)dx + ¯
for a 2 A and this would lead to the contradiction E[Xjha;±i] < c as well. Thus no
credible announcement strategy can be made related to the truth-telling equilibrium.
The same arguments show that every equilibrium which is outcome-equivalent to the
truth-telling equilibrium is EAP.
Now, we prove that any equilibrium which is not outcome-equivalent to the truth-
telling equilibrium is not EAP. In such an equilibrium, an announcement strategy ± in
which every neutral sender who observes x announces hx;±i with probability one and
biased senders make announcements hm;±i according to the density fb(m) described in
(13) with c given by the root of (14) is credible related to such an equilibrium. It is
straightforward checking that such an announcement strategy satis¯es C1, C2, C3, and
C5. Finally C4 is readily veri¯ed since the set of non-deviants is empty. Thus, such an
equilibrium cannot be EAP.
The previous result suggests that the truth-telling equilibrium stands out from other
equilibria{beyond the fact of restricting the neutral senders to behave according to a
natural focal point and ubiquitous social norm. This equilibrium is selected according
to the equilibrium-announcement proofness criterion and any equilibrium which satis-
¯es this criterion is outcome equivalent to the truth-telling equilibrium. For example,
26this re¯nement criterion sets aside the truth-telling equilibrium from all the partitional
equilibria described in the uniform example of Section 3.3. None of these equilibria
is EAP as they are not outcome equivalent to the truth-telling equilibrium. However,
the upholding equilibrium we described in Section 3.2 is outcome equivalent with the
truth-telling and thus is EAP.
As mentioned above, the literature o®ers several other re¯nement criteria for cheap
talk games. Although less formally, we now discuss how the truth-telling equilibrium
fares with a few of these criteria. Farrell (1993) introduces a re¯nement criterion based
on the concept of neologisms. Neologisms are statements senders may make to identify
their self, or themselves in the case a group of senders takes part in a given neologism.
Credibility of a neologism requires the senders who sends a neologism to prefer the
expected quality induced by the neologism to the quality which would be induced in the
equilibrium (see Matthews et al., 1991, page 255). However, as shown in the proof of the
Theorem 3, it is not possible for any sender in the truth-telling equilibrium to change
the expected quality induced by this equilibrium to another induced expected quality
which is preferred to this sender. For the neutral sender who has observed quality x · c,
this is impossible because he is inducing an expected quality which is exactly equal to
the observed quality, and that is exactly his objective. For the neutral sender who has
observed quality x > c, it is also impossible to increase the expected induced quality,
because of the same argument in the proof of the Theorem 3. Thus, the truth-telling
equilibrium is neologism proof as well.
We now analyze the implications of the re¯nement criterion of Chen et al. (2008)
for our equilibrium analysis. Chen et al. (2008) propose a criterion called NITS (for no
incentives to separate) to select among equilibria in the model of Crawford and Sobel
(1982). The equilibria that satisfy it are ones that satisfy a simple condition in the
equilibrium payo®s. In the context of our model, this condition is translated to the
requirement that the sender who has observed the lowest quality is at least as well-
o® in the equilibrium as when he can accurately induce the observed quality. Chen
et al. (2008) show that NITS selects among equilibria and under certain conditions,
the only equilibrium which satis¯es NITS is the most informative equilibrium. In the
truth-telling equilibrium of our game, there is no incentive to separate because the
neutral sender who observes the lowest quality, in equilibrium, induces an expected
quality equal to the lowest quality, and the biased sender does not have an incentives
27to separate either. Therefore, the truth-telling equilibrium satis¯es NITS. Finally, our
example of the partitional equilibria in Section 3.3 allows us to illustrate further the
selecting power of NITS. In particular, none of the partitional equilibria with N = 1;2:::
partitions satis¯es NITS. In any of these equilibria, the neutral sender who observes
x = 0 would prefer the receiver to expect the quality to be equal to zero. However in
all those equilibria, the neutral sender who observes x = 0 induces an expected quality
greater than zero. Thus, none of these equilibria satisfy NITS.
5 Summary and Discussion
Our main results are Lemma 1 and Theorem 2. Lemma 1 establishes that, in any
perfect Bayesian equilibrium, all the messages sent by the biased sender induce the
same expected quality from the point of view of the receiver. This expected quality is
the highest expected quality which may be induced by any message in that equilibrium.
This result follows immediately from the fact that the biased sender only cares about
maximising the expected quality he induces. Perhaps more importantly, this expected
quality is greater than the unconditional expected quality and strictly less than the
maximum quality. This implies that there is an upper bound to the quality that can be
communicated in equilibrium.
We also provide di®erent equilibria of the game. In one of these equilibria (Theorem
2), the neutral sender reveals the observed quality truthfully, i.e., his message is always
the quality he has observed. It may not be surprising that such a result emerges in
a pure common interest strategic situation, yet this is much less obvious in a context
where the sender is suspected to be biased. Theorem 2 establishes that truth-telling for
neutral senders arises in equilibrium, even though the receiver knows that the sender
may be biased. This, in our analysis, occurs only because the preferences of the neutral
sender and the receiver are perfectly aligned and without assuming intrinsic preferences
for truth-telling (or cost of lying). We also show that in this equilibrium the messages
sent by the biased sender cannot be fully in°ated, which means that he does not always
report the maximum quality. Instead, the biased sender uses a feigning strategy by
spreading out the range of messages he may send. However, the support of this mixed
strategy is bounded below by the expected quality induced in the equilibrium, which is
strictly higher than the unconditional expected quality.
28The other equilibrium we analyze is characterized by in°ated messages from the
biased sender, in°ated messages from the neutral sender who observed a quality level
above a certain threshold, and truthful messages from the neutral sender who observed
a quality level below the threshold. This result is consistent with observed patterns
of communication transmission in recommendation letters of highly competitive job-
markets. In such markets, if most recommendation letters are written very generously,
then a message which is not clearly fully supportive may be interpreted by the receiver as
a negative signal. In our model, even the neutral sender, whose objectives are perfectly
aligned with those of the receiver, may exaggerate about the quality of the good in
order to avoid an undesired choice of the receiver. This incentive to exaggerate occurs
only when the observed quality of the recommended good is high enough. We call such
strategy upholding because the neutral recommender uses in°ated language to induce
the recruiter to choose the recommended person. However, the messages sent by the
neutral sender are not deceptive as the quality they observe when they exaggerate is
greater than the induced expected quality.
It is worth comparing our results to those in the literature of costly talk (see Ottaviani
and Squintani, 2006; Kartik, Ottaviani, and Squintani, 2007). Kartik et al. (2007)
study a general framework in which a biased sender sends a message to a group of
audience consisted naive and strategic receivers. They show that a fully separating
equilibrium exists when the state and message spaces are unbounded above. They also
show that strategic receivers are always able to infer exactly the state of the world,
despite the in°ated language used by the sender, while naive receivers are deceived as
they believe the received message is the true state of the world. In contrast, we show that
when there is a sender whose type is unobservable, it is possible to have an equilibrium
where the neutral sender always reveals the truth. However, this equilibrium fails to
be fully separating as the potential presence of a biased sender makes high messages
unreliable. Therefore, in our setting, all high qualities induce the same expected quality
in equilibrium.
In a related work, Ottaviani and Squintani (2006) analyze a model similar to the
one in Kartik et al. (2007), but with a bounded state space. Similar to our paper, they
¯nd that fully revealing is possible for low states of the world. For the top range of
the state space, they identify a partitional equilibrium, while we show that information
transmission on the top range of qualities is totally uninformative. It is important to
29notice a fundamental di®erence between these two models with naive receivers and our
model which follows directly from the assumptions. In the aforementioned papers, since
the preferences of the senders are common knowledge, only naive receivers are victims of
deception. In our analysis, even though the receiver is fully strategic, she is expected to
be deceived by the biased sender because, in equilibrium, the biased sender can always
pursuade the receiver to believe that the expected quality given his message is higher
than the unconditional expected quality.
The fact that the neutral sender in our model is a strategic player, i.e., he does not
necessarily have to be honest, is also assumed by Morris (2001). However, he focuses
on the dynamics of information transmission and the sender's reputation. Morris ¯nds
that both sender types have a short-term incentive to deceive when they are concerned
about reputation. In this paper, neutral senders do not have an incentive to deceive the
receiver since there are no bene¯ts from gaining reputation. In the upholding equilibrium
in which messages by the neutral senders are in°ated, the receiver is not deceived by
the neutral sender. In fact, in such equilibrium, given the set of equilibrium beliefs, the
neutral sender would have misled the receiver if he revealed the true quality.
Our description of the preferences of the biased sender resembles the description of
the sender in persuasion games. In the literature on persuasion, usually it is common
knowledge that the sender wants to persuade the receiver to make a certain choice and
the message may be fully or partially veri¯able. Dziuda (2008) considers conditions in
which revealing information that, at face value, does not seem to favor the interests of
the biased sender. In our cheap talk model, the biased sender can not credibly reveal any
information. However, the feigning strategies we obtain play a similar role by raising
the posterior belief of the receiver that the sender may be neutral.
There is a close connection between Theorem 1 in our paper and the proposition in
Wolinsky (2003). He considers a sender-receiver game where the receiver must decide
(within a ¯nite set) the amount of money to invest in a given project. The sender can be
either fully biased to the left or fully biased to the right, i.e., he may prefer the receiver
to minimize or maximize her investment. The sender's private information is his type
of bias and the state of the world, which corresponds to the amount of money to invest
that would be optimal for the receiver. In his model, the receiver can realize that the
sender is lying only if the message of the sender is greater than the true state. This
leads to the result that every equilibrium of his model is equivalent to an equilibrium in
30which the right-biased sender always reveals truthfully the observed state of the world,
and the left biased sender uses a mixed strategy in the bottom range of messages. This
result is analogous to our truth-telling equilibrium and feigning strategies. In contrast
to our results, the veri¯ability assumption rules out equilibria with less information
transmission such as the babbling equilibria or those we described in Section 3.3.
Finally, it seems natural to extend our model to a sender-receiver game with multiple
senders. Consider a situation where there is one position to be ¯lled and n applicants
have applied. Each applicant's quality is independent from one another's, observed by
the applicant's professor, and unobserved by the recruiter. If each professor sends a
letter of recommendation to the recruiter to report the quality of the applicant, there
will be n senders, each sends a message about the quality of his student to the recruiter.
The analysis of such a game would be analogous to the analysis of the game described
in this paper.
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